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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: **AUG 02 2010**
LIN-07-070-52515

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is [REDACTED]. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a senior application software engineer pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). As required by statute, an ETA Form 9089 Application for Permanent Employment Certification (ETA Form 9089) approved by the Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. Upon reviewing the petition, the director determined that the beneficiary did not satisfy the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification. Specifically, the director determined that the beneficiary did not possess a U.S. Master's degree or foreign equivalent degree or a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. Bachelor's degree plus at least five years of experience in the specialty required by the certified ETA Form 9089.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner established the beneficiary's educational qualifications with the evaluation stating that the beneficiary attained the equivalent of U.S. Master of Science degree in computer science or engineering based the beneficiary's two-year master's degree in information technology from the Alagappa University in India.

The record shows that the appeal is properly and timely filed, and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id.*

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

The record contains the beneficiary's transcripts showing that the beneficiary completed the three years of study and passed the Bachelor of Commerce (3 year degree course) examination [REDACTED], and master of science degree in information technology and transcripts for the two years of study from the Alagappa University in India in August 2004. Thus, the issue is whether the beneficiary's master degree is, on its own, a single source foreign equivalent to a U.S. master's degree, if not, whether the beneficiary is qualified for the proffered position with her single source foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate degree plus five years of experience. We must also consider whether the beneficiary meets the job requirements of the proffered job as set forth on the labor certification.

Eligibility for the Classification Sought

As noted above, the ETA Form 9089 in this matter is certified by DOL. DOL's role is limited to determining whether there are sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified and available and whether the employment of the alien will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act; 20 C.F.R. § 656.1(a).

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether or not the alien is qualified for a specific immigrant classification or even the job offered. This fact has not gone unnoticed by federal circuit courts. *See Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

The AAO is bound by the Act, agency regulations, precedent decisions of the agency and published decisions from the circuit court of appeals from whatever circuit that the action arose. *See N.L.R.B. v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp.*, 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987) (administrative agencies are not free to refuse to follow precedent in cases originating within the circuit); *R.L. Inv. Ltd. Partners v. INS*, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (D. Haw. 2000), *aff'd* 273 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished agency decisions and agency legal memoranda are not binding under the APA, even when they are published in private publications or widely circulated).

A United States baccalaureate degree is generally found to require four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg'l. Comm'r. 1977). This decision involved a petition filed under 8 U.S.C. §1153(a)(3) as amended in 1976. At that time, this section provided:

Visas shall next be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions

The Act added section 203(b)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(2)(A), which provides:

Visas shall be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent

Significantly, the statutory language used prior to *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 244 is identical to the statutory language used subsequent to that decision but for the requirement that the immigrant hold an advanced degree or its equivalent. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, published as part of the House of Representatives Conference Report on the Act, provides that “[in] considering equivalency in category 2 advanced degrees, it is anticipated that the alien must have a bachelor’s degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 955, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 1990 WL 201613 at 6786 (Oct. 26, 1990).

At the time of enactment of section 203(b)(2) of the Act in 1990, it had been almost thirteen years since *Matter of Shah* was issued. Congress is presumed to have intended a four-year degree when it stated that an alien “must have a bachelor’s degree” when considering equivalency for second preference immigrant visas. We must assume that Congress was aware of the agency’s previous treatment of a “bachelor’s degree” under the Act when the new classification was enacted and did not intend to alter the agency’s interpretation of that term. See *Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (Congress is presumed to be aware of administrative and judicial interpretations where it adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree).

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor’s degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree:

The Act states that, in order to qualify under the second classification, alien members of the professions must hold “advanced degrees or their equivalent.” As the legislative history . . . indicates, the equivalent of an advanced degree is “a bachelor’s degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions.” Because neither the Act nor its legislative history indicates that bachelor’s or advanced degrees must be United States degrees, the Service will recognize foreign equivalent degrees. But both the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree.*

56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (emphasis added).

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(2) of the Act as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree. More specifically, a three-year bachelor’s degree will not be considered to be the “foreign equivalent degree” to a United States baccalaureate degree.

Matter of Shah, 17 I&N Dec. at 245. In the instant case, the three-year bachelor of commerce degree from Osmania University is not the foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. baccalaureate degree.

We have reviewed the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) created by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officer (AACRAO). AACRAO, according to its website, www.aacrao.org, is "a nonprofit, voluntary, professional association of more than 10,000 higher education admissions and registration professionals who represent approximately 2,500 institutions in more than 30 countries." Its mission "is to provide professional development, guidelines and voluntary standards to be used by higher education officials regarding the best practices in records management, admissions, enrollment management, administrative information technology and student services." According to the registration page for EDGE, <http://aacraoedge.aacrao.org/register/index/php>, EDGE is "a web-based resource for the evaluation of foreign educational credentials."

While EDGE confirms that a three-year bachelor of commerce degree from India is awarded upon completion of three years of university or college programs following higher secondary education and represents attainment of a level of education comparable to three years of university study in the United States, it does not suggest that a three-year degree from India may be deemed a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. baccalaureate. In order to have experience and education equating to an advanced degree under section 203(b)(2) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). Here the beneficiary's three-year bachelor of commerce degree from Osmania University does not represent attainment of a level of education comparable to a bachelor's degree in the United States.

EDGE also confirms that while a master of science awarded upon completion of two years of study beyond the two- or three-year bachelor's degree in India is not the foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. master's degree, it represents attainment of a level of education comparable to a bachelor's degree in the United States. In order to have experience and education equating to an advanced degree under section 203(b)(2) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2).

For this classification, advanced degree professional, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(B) requires the submission of an "official academic record showing that the alien has a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree." For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires the submission of "an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." We cannot conclude that the evidence required to demonstrate that an alien is an advanced degree professional is any less than the evidence required to show that the alien is a professional. To do so would undermine the congressionally mandated classification scheme by allowing a lesser evidentiary standard for the more restrictive visa classification. Moreover, the commentary accompanying the proposed advanced degree professional regulation specifically states that a "baccalaureate means a bachelor's degree received *from a college or university*, or an equivalent degree." (Emphasis added.) 56 Fed. Reg. 30703, 30306 (July 5, 1991). Cf. 8 C.F.R.

§ 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability requiring the submission of “an official academic record showing that the alien has a degree, *diploma, certificate or similar award* from a college, university, *school or other institution of learning* relating to the area of exceptional ability”). In this case, the record contains evidence showing that the beneficiary’s master of science degree in information technology from the Alagappa University in India is a single source degree awarded from an accredited university in India and represents attainment of a level of education comparable to a bachelor of science degree in the United States.

Counsel submits evaluations from Foreign Credential Evaluations, Inc. (FCE), and The Trustforte Corporation to support his assertion that the beneficiary possessed a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. master’s degree in computer science or engineering based on the beneficiary’s two-year master of science degree in information technology beyond her three-year bachelor of commerce degree. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may, in its discretion, use an evaluation by a credentials evaluation organization of a person’s foreign education as an advisory opinion only. However, where an evaluation is not in accord with previous equivalencies or is in any way questionable, it may be discounted or given less weight. *Matter of Sea, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988). USCIS is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm. 1988).

The beneficiary has a “United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree,” and thus, meet the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of an advanced degree, namely a Bachelor’s degree, for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(2) of the Act. However, to qualify for the second preference classification, the beneficiary must establish that he possessed at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty after his bachelor’s equivalent degree but prior to the priority date.

Qualifications for the Job Offered

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the U.S. Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL’s role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS’s decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)[(5)] of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating: “The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.” *Tongatapu*, 736 F. 2d at 1309.

The key to determining the job qualifications is found on ETA Form 9089 Part H. This section of the application for alien labor certification, “Job Opportunity Information,” describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA Form 9089 be read as a whole.

Moreover, when determining whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. USCIS must examine “the language of the labor certification job requirements” in order to determine what the job requires. *Id.* The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer. *See Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve reading and applying *the plain language* of the alien employment certification application form. *See id.* at 834. USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In this matter, Part H, line 4, of the labor certification reflects that a bachelor’s degree is the minimum level of education required. Line 6 reflects that the proffered position requires 60 months (five years) of experience in the job offered. In lines 8 to 8-C, the petitioner indicates that it will accept an alternate combination of a master’s degree and three years of experience in the job offered.

As previously discussed, the beneficiary does not possess a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. master’s degree. The beneficiary’s two-year master of science degree in information technology is equivalent to a U.S. bachelor’s degree. Therefore, to qualify for the second preference classification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) or the requirements set forth on the ETA Form 9089, the beneficiary must establish that she possessed at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty and in the job offered after her bachelor’s equivalent degree but prior to the priority date. The beneficiary obtained her bachelor equivalent degree from the Alagappa University in May 2003

and the priority date in the instant case is March 8, 2006. Therefore, it is impossible for the beneficiary to establish her five years of progressive experience in the specialty and job offered because the period from her obtaining degree to the priority date in this case is less than five years.

The beneficiary has a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," but does not have the required five years of experience in the specialty and job offered as set forth on the ETA Form 9089, and thus, does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(2) of the Act. Therefore, the beneficiary does not meet the job requirements on the labor certification. For these reasons, considered both in sum and as separate grounds for denial, the petition may not be approved.

Beyond the director's decision and counsel's assertions on appeal, the AAO has identified an additional ground of ineligibility and will discuss whether or not the petitioner has established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is March 8, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$35.26 per hour (\$73,340.80 per year).

The petitioner claimed to have 80 employees on the ETA Form 9089 but claimed 130 employees on the petition. While 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) allows the director accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establish the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage in a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the petitioner did not provide any statement from its financial officer in this case.

Where the petitioner has submitted the requisite initial documentation required in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during the relevant period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted the beneficiary's W-2 form for 2005 and paystubs for 2006. Since the priority date is March 8, 2006, the beneficiary's W-2 form for 2005 is not necessarily dispositive. The petitioner submitted the beneficiary's monthly paystubs for a period from July to November 2006. The paystubs show that the petitioner paid the beneficiary, at the rate of \$45.60 per hour, \$7,296.00 on August 1, 2006, \$8,390.40 on September 5, 2006, \$6,201.60 on October 3, 2006, \$8,025.60 on November 1, 2006 and \$6,931.20 on December 1, 2006. Since the petitioner paid the beneficiary on a monthly basis, the payment on December 1, 2006 is the last payment in 2006. The year-to-date earnings as of December, also the yearly earnings in 2006, were \$71,880.80. Therefore, the petitioner established that it paid a partial proffered wage but failed to establish that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage of \$73,340.80 in 2006, the year of the priority date. The petitioner must demonstrate that it had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference of \$1,460.00 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage in 2006 and the full proffered wage per year thereafter.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Federal courts have recognized the reliance on federal income tax returns as a valid basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, any argument that the petitioner's total assets should be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds

available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d). Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

The evidence in the record shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. The petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. The record contains the petitioner's Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return for 2005. However, it is not necessarily dispositive since the priority date is March 8, 2006. Counsel submitted the petitioner's Income Statement for one month ended December 31, 2005 and one month ended December 31, 2004, and Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2005. However, these financial statements are not dispositive because they were for the period prior to the priority date. In addition, these financial statements are not audited. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements. The unaudited financial statements that counsel submitted with the petition are not persuasive evidence. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner failed to submit evidence to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the difference between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage in 2006, and to pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2007 and subsequent years. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

In addition, if the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending or approved simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions or approved petitions, including I-129 nonimmigrant petitions.

² According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

USCIS records show that the petitioner filed 1,247 immigrant and nonimmigrant petitions with service centers. The record does not contain any documentary evidence showing that the petitioner fulfilled its obligations to pay these beneficiaries of immigrant and nonimmigrant petitions their proffered wages or prevailing wages. The record does not contain evidence showing that the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay these proffered wages or prevailing wages in 2006 onwards. Therefore, the petitioner failed to establish its continuing ability to pay all the proffered wages in these relevant years.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner did not submit documentary evidence to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage for a single year of those it must demonstrate that it had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the proffered wage. In addition, given the record as a whole, the petitioner's history of filing petitions and the fact that the number of immigrant and nonimmigrant petitions filed reflects ten times of the petitioner's current workforce, the AAO must also take into account the petitioner's ability to pay the petitioner's wages in the context of its overall recruitment efforts. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wages.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.